Technology, along with all other facets of human communication, is changing the forms in which deception happens and how it is identified. But, as we'll see, our assumptions about how technology and deception affect each other are not always as easy as they seem, and we suggest here that there are many main factors that need to be considered in the networked age to understand deception, including prejudices and heuristics unique to deception, the transformation of the space of interaction, and our own perceptions of ourselves as good, truthful.
While this sounds like a fairly straightforward statement, this heuristic has three major assumptions. The first assumption is that online there are fewer signs than face-to - face (FtF), especially an email with fewer signals than the phone. The second is that there are accurate indicators to detect deception. It is near-universal to assume that liars send off signals that may show their deceit. The last theory is that they'll lie more because people can get away with it. Since there are fewer signs that make it harder to spot deceit in the case of lies online, people can take advantage of this reality and lie more.
The belief in this heuristic signal is common, as it was discovered in a population survey on their views about the conduct of deception. Each of the assumptions that underlie the heuristic indications is problematic.
On its face, the first assumption, that online contact has less signals, seems specific. The second statement, that signals are helpful for detecting deception, is based on many deception-related misconceptions and does not take into account recent meta-analyses of many decades of research into deception detection. The third premise implicit in the heuristic signs is that if they can get away with it, people will lie more. This assumption is fundamentally flawed as well, it turns out.
Such observational results stand in stark contrast to the views of most people about the signs of deception. Many of these deception identification myths are routinely depicted in the mass media. Those misguided illusions throughout the signs of deception, namely that there can be accurate nonverbal indicators, indicate to individuals that it is much more hard to trace online deception. Currently, there is very little proof that this is the case.
The wider change that technology has wrought in human interaction is a more valuable way to address manipulation and technology than merely relying on signals. When we step back to understand this history of interpersonal human contact, the radical changes that contact technology has brought to the space of human interaction are put into perspective.
Such improvements to the space of interaction have a profound impact on how deception and deception detection work, but this impact is not merely a matter of signals, as mentioned before. Here we identify three ways in which human communication deception has been altered by the transformation of the contact space: (1) the introduction of the display as a mode of interaction, (2) the effect of certain communication characteristics introduced by these changes, such as the behavioral traces that we now leave behind in digital contexts, and (3) the presence of warrants or ties in virtual space
The implementation of the show, in the sense of deception, implies that interlocutors have far more control over their room for interaction. Spam, which can be misleading in a number of ways, is the most well-known of these. The power that the fraudster has over the user's display makes both spam and phishing possible.
Changes to the way we use manipulation in computer-mediated contexts come with the transformation of our interaction space. To date , research indicates that variations in the way people lie through communication channels are shaped by particular characteristics of these various media. First, it is argued that a communication medium's recordability, or the degree to which communication has a lasting record in a given room, should affect deceptive conduct. The synchronicity of communication is the second function of communication media that is important to deception. A third feature of communication media that may determine misleading behavior is whether communicators are co-present. Synchronicity refers to the degree to which a conversation takes place in real-time. The three elements of the feature-based model suggest that individuals should be more interested in telephone conversations than in FtF conversations. Evidence for the feature-based model of deception and technology is given by the above studies.
Self-enhancing deceptions are widespread and usually driven by a desire to positively portray oneself to others. These online activity traces provide social network users with a highly comprehensive image of features and activities that would be difficult to match, if not impossible, with information collected in offline contexts. Although some of the specific features of online communication that enable deception are discussed earlier, these new possibilities for online self-presentation, such as websites for social networking, present substantial new deception constraints.
Deception for the intent of self-presentation provides the reward of looking to others more optimistic, but dishonest actions carry a host of repercussions with them. Many of our professional activities can now be carried out online, with individuals on professional networking websites such as LinkedIn searching and applying for jobs and building personal profiles. For publicly accessible LinkedIn profiles, the risk of being caught in a lie about past jobs should be higher than for conventional resumes. From the justified self-presentation viewpoint, these results make sense: deception should be restricted by individuals in the social network of a person who have access to profile information.
Three types of warrants were considered: (a) name warrants, or references to the actual name of an individual; (b) photo warrants, which included identifiable photos of an individual that could be visually related to their real-world identity; and (c) acquaintance warrants, which were characterized by the degree to which the contact partners of an individual were aware of their identity offline.